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INTRODUCTION 
Illicit trafficking in small arms and light weapons (“SALW”) 
undermines the stability of governments and the security of 
communities around the globe.1 SALW are particularly dangerous 
because they are extremely lethal, yet portable and easy to use.2 
Despite the tangible threats presented by SALW, however, the global 
arms industry continues to manufacture these weapons at an 
alarming rate.3 SALW are readily available on the legal market 
through legitimate sales as well as on the black and gray markets 
through illegal diversions.4 Consequently, SALW are valued tools of 
the trade for violent criminals, both domestic and transnational.  
 
 1. See DAMIEN ROGERS, POSTINTERNATIONALISM AND SMALL ARMS 
CONTROL: THEORY, POLITICS, SECURITY 51 (Ashgate 2009) (1975) (noting that the 
impact of violence through the use of SALW is felt across national borders and has 
a deleterious effect on human security worldwide). There is no universally 
accepted definition of SALW, but there is a general consensus that “small arms” 
refers to weapons such as machine guns which can be wielded by an individual, 
whereas “light weapons” include larger, military-style weapons that usually require 
a crew of people to operate. See also CHRISTINE JOJARTH, CRIME, WAR, AND 
GLOBAL TRAFFICKING: DESIGNING INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION 223 (2009) 
(discussing the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe’s working 
definition of SALW, which is widely accepted in the field of international policy). 
 2. See Harold Hongju Koh, A World Drowning in Guns, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 
2333, 2335 (2003) (emphasizing that even children can carry and operate SALW 
with “sickening ease”). 
 3. See KIM CRAGIN & BRUCE HOFFMAN, RAND NAT’L DEF. RES. INST., ARMS 
TRAFFICKING AND COLOMBIA 52 (2003) (observing that in 2001, over 600 
companies produced SALW—a three-fold increase since 1980). 
 4. See id. at xiii n.1 (explaining that SALW are available through three 
different channels: 1) the licit market, where weapons are legally exchanged via 
authorized actors; 2) the gray market, where one of the parties to the transaction is 
legitimate, but the other is not; and 3) the black market, where transactions occur 
between illegitimate parties). The most common diversions of SALW occur when 
weapons are sold to non-state actors, such as paramilitary groups, and moved 
across national borders without the authorization of all states involved. See 
JOJARTH, supra note 1, at 224 (defining diversion as “the movement of a weapon 
from legal origins to the illicit realm”). 
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SALW trafficking has had a devastating effect on many regions, 
particularly Latin America, which has seen dramatic increases in 
crime and violence due to the illicit weapons trade.5 Though 
democratic Latin American states have developed economically and 
politically, threats to security have shifted from conflicts between 
states to the activities of subversive, transnational criminal groups.6 
Inadequate controls on military stockpiles and widespread 
government corruption have further aggravated this tenuous situation 
because both are linked to illicit SALW transfers.7 The combination 
of Latin America’s political environment with a hazardous increase 
in the availability of SALW is endangering individual safety, 
hindering economic development, and depleting states’ confidence in 
their governmental structures.8 
Illicit SALW trafficking is not unregulated in Latin America.9 
Thirty of the thirty-five member states of the Organization of 
 
 5. See Nidya Sarria, Small Arms in Latin America in the Aftermath of the 
NACLA Study, COUNCIL ON HEMISPHERIC AFFAIRS, Aug. 18, 2009, 
http://www.coha.org/small-arms-in-latin-america-in-the-aftermath-of-the-nacla-
study/ (discussing statistics showing that there are 45 to 80 million SALW in Latin 
America, and observing that while most of these weapons were purchased legally, 
many have been used for unlawful purposes like drug trafficking and homicides); 
Rachel Stohl & Doug Tuttle, The Small Arms Trade in Latin America, NACLA 
Report on the Americas, Mar. – Apr. 2008, at 16 (observing unexpected increases 
in gun-related homicide in decades following cessation of civil warfare in Latin 
American countries). 
 6. See generally Bruce Zagaris, Developments in the Institutional Architecture 
and Framework of International Criminal Enforcement Cooperation in the 
Western Hemisphere, 37 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 421, 444-511 (2006) 
(summarizing the development of Latin American responses to security issues and 
recognizing that transnational criminals capitalize on economic development and 
globalization by operating in multiple states simultaneously). 
 7. See JOJARTH, supra note 1, at 224 (stressing that mismanagement of 
stockpiles and corrupt government officials are often the root cause of weapons 
diversions); MATTHEW SCHROEDER, FED’N OF AM. SCIENTISTS, SMALL ARMS, 
TERRORISM, AND THE OAS FIREARMS CONVENTION 4 (2004) (arguing that 
“inadequately controlled caches of Cold War weaponry” are a “potentially 
lucrative source of profit for unscrupulous arms brokers and a deadly threat to the 
rest of us”). 
 8. See ROGERS, supra note 1, at 35 (maintaining that illicit SALW trafficking 
undermines the authority of sovereign governments); Sarria, supra note 5 
(asserting that easy access to SALW increases the potential for localized, violent 
conflicts throughout Latin America and stalls economic growth). 
 9. See infra Part I(A) (describing regional and global level SALW trafficking 
instruments in effect in Latin America). 
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American States (“OAS”) have ratified the Inter-American 
Convention Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in 
Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, and Other Related Materials 
(“CIFTA”).10 However, many of these states are falling short of full 
compliance with CIFTA.11 This Comment evaluates CIFTA’s 
efficacy in light of this non-compliance and through specific 
comparison to global level United Nations (“U.N.”) agreements, and 
argues that a dynamic and comprehensive response by the OAS and 
state parties is necessary. Though CIFTA covers illicit 
manufacturing and trafficking, this Comment will focus on the 
agreement’s trafficking section only.12  
Part I of this Comment provides an overview of CIFTA and the 
two primary U.N. instruments regulating illicit SALW trafficking.13 
This section also illustrates confirmed and probable CIFTA 
violations.14 Part II offers a thorough analysis of CIFTA’s strengths 
 
 10. See generally Organization of American States (OAS), Inter-American 
Convention Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, 
Ammunition, Explosives, and Other Related Materials, Nov. 14, 1997, [hereinafter 
CIFTA] available at http://www.oas.org/juridico/e nglish/treaties/a-63.html 
(controlling trade in firearms, ammunition, explosives and related materials, 
requiring criminalization of illicit manufacturing and trafficking, and encouraging 
cooperation between state parties). There are also binding and non-binding U.N. 
agreements in place to which many Latin American states are parties. See infra 
Part I(A)(2) (introducing the U.N. Protocol and Programme of Action). 
 11. See Conference of the States Party to the Inter-American Convention 
Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, 
Explosives, and Other Related Materials (CIFTA), Second Conference of the 
States Party to CIFTA, Mexico City, Mex., Feb. 20-21, 2008, Summary of Country 
Compliance With CIFTA: Status of Ratifications and National Firearms 
Legislation in Force, 1, OEA/Ser.L/XXII.4.2 CIFTA/CEP-II/doc.5/08 (Feb. 8, 
2008) [hereinafter Summary of Country Compliance] (noting incomplete 
compliance with marking, export, and recordkeeping requirements by many 
CIFTA parties). 
 12. See CIFTA, supra note 10, art. II (vowing to combat both unlawful 
manufacturing and trafficking in SALW). 
 13. See infra Part I(A) (delineating the requirements of CIFTA, the U.N. 
Protocol, and the U.N. Programme of Action). The United Nations Office for 
Disarmament Affairs is currently drafting the Arms Trade Treaty (“ATT”) aimed 
at “strengthen[ing] non-proliferation, disarmament and arms control measures.” 
United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, Towards an Arms Trade Treaty, 
http://www.un.org/disarmament/convarms/ArmsTradeTreaty/html/ATT-OEWG-
Statements-1.shtml. 
 14. See infra Part I(B) (describing a diversion of Nicaraguan AK-47s that 
contravened CIFTA and a potentially unlawful diversion of Venezuelan anti-tank 
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and weaknesses, emphasizing flaws in the agreement’s 
implementation and certain textual inadequacies.15 Part III 
recommends that the OAS devise a compliance mechanism to 
oversee CIFTA’s implementation and make specific textual 
amendments as a means to compel states to fulfill their obligations 
under the treaty.16  
I. BACKGROUND 
A. INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS REGULATING SALW 
TRAFFICKING  
Many arms control agreements are rooted in the notion that states 
have an inherent right of self-defense, and therefore also possess the 
right to acquire weapons for themselves and to transfer them to other 
states.17 States view weapons, particularly SALW, as beneficial to 
their own security.18 At the same time, states also recognize that 
criminals or rebel groups can use weapons like SALW to contravene 
their authority and challenge their stability.19 Accordingly, states 
enter into agreements regulating SALW to legally justify their own 




 15. See infra Part II (acknowledging positive progress resulting from CIFTA’s 
implementation, but also criticizing the treaty’s lack of enforcement mechanisms 
and imprecision). 
 16. See infra Part III (recommending that the OAS develop financially realistic 
compliance mechanisms for CIFTA and proposing specific modifications to 
CIFTA’s text). 
 17. See Theresa A. DiPerna, Small Arms and Light Weapons: Complicity “With 
a View” Towards Extended State Responsibility, 20 FLA. J. INT’L L. 25, 33-34 
(2008) (recognizing that states derive rights to individual and collective self-
defense from customary international law and Article 51 of the U.N. Charter). 
 18. Id. at 34. 
 19. See ROGERS, supra note 1, at 107 (discussing the balancing that 
governments must do in controlling small arms because the proliferation of illegal 
small arms threatens the rule of law). 
 20. See Guido den Dekker, The Effectiveness of International Supervision in 
Arms Control Law, 9 J. CONFLICT & SEC. L. 315, 318-19 (2004) (proffering that 
arms control agreements are a primary means for states to guarantee security 
through the control of weapons). 
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Agreements regulating illicit trafficking in SALW are generally 
created and implemented through international organizations, such as 
the U.N. or the OAS, of which state parties are members.21 These 
international agreements range from “hard law” instruments, such as 
treaties, to “soft law” instruments, like political pacts, codes of 
conduct, and recommendations.22 The form of an instrument defines 
its role in the regulation of SALW: “hard law” instruments create 
obligations to which sovereign states are legally bound, while “soft 
law” instruments declare standards that states should seek to attain.23 
An additional distinction between these two legal forms is that “hard 
law” instruments often contain compliance mechanisms to ensure 
that states fulfill their obligations, whereas “soft law” treaties do not 
because they are aspirational and non-binding.24 Such compliance 
mechanisms can vary from programs monitoring implementation to 
sanctions and trade embargoes.25 
CIFTA, as well as the U.N. Protocol against the Illicit 
Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and 
Components and Ammunition (“U.N. Protocol”), are “hard law.”26 In 
 
 21. See ROGERS, supra note 1, at 106 (addressing various forms of SALW 
agreements stemming from international organizations, including the U.N. and 
regional organizations in Latin America). 
 22. Cf. Herbert V. Morais, Fighting International Crime and Its Financing: 
The Importance of Following a Coherent Global Strategy Based on the Rule of 
Law, 50 VILL. L. REV. 583, 591 (2005) (noting that international regulations of 
criminal activities (e.g. money laundering) tend to be a mixture of both “hard” and 
“soft law”). 
 23. See, Richard L. Williamson, Jr., Hard Law, Soft Law, and Non-Law in 
Multilateral Arms Control: Some Compliance Hypotheses, 4 CHI. J. INT’L L. 59, 
62-64 (2003) (explaining that “hard law” represents a codification of norms that 
states consent to be bound by whereas “soft law” does not impose duties upon 
states). 
 24. See id. at 70-71 (reasoning that mechanisms in hard instruments incentivize 
state compliance). 
 25. See generally Thilo Marauhn, Dispute Resolution, Compliance Control and 
Enforcement of International Arms Control Law, in MAKING TREATIES WORK: 
HUMAN RIGHTS, ENVIRONMENT AND ARMS CONTROL 243, 243-45 (Geir Ulfstein 
ed., 2007) (discussing historical changes in compliance and enforcement 
approaches to arms control treaties). 
 26. See Protocol Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in 
Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition Supplementing the United 
Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, G.A. Res. 55/255, 
arts. 1, 2, U.N. GAOR, 55th Sess., 101st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/RES/55/255 
(May 31, 2001) [hereinafter U.N. Protocol] (requiring parties to control small arms 
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contrast, the U.N. Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and 
Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All 
Its Aspects (“Programme of Action”) is “soft law.”27 Thus, while the 
Programme of Action successfully establishes norms for states to 
abide by in their respective fights against SALW trafficking, states 
ultimately decide for themselves whether to abide by its terms.28  
1. Overview of CIFTA: Development, Requirements, and Successes 
CIFTA was the first legally binding regional agreement to address 
the problem of SALW trafficking.29 Proposals for the agreement 
evolved from the OAS’ counter-narcotics efforts during the mid-
1990s when officials saw a linkage between drug and weapons 
trafficking.30 The OAS’s Permanent Council and the Inter-American 
Drug Abuse Control Commission (“CICAD”) organized three 
meetings of experts between 1993 and 1996 to discuss potential 
firearms regulations.31 The meetings led to the creation of the Model 
Regulations for the Control of the International Movement of 
Firearms, Their Parts and Components, and Ammunition (“CICAD 
Model Regulations”).32 Following this development, a group of states 
known as the Rio Group, prepared a draft treaty and presented it to 
 
as a means to combat transnational organized crime). 
 27. See U.N. Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons 
in All Its Aspects, July 9-20, 2001, Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and 
Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, 
pmbl., ¶ 22, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.192/15 (July 20, 2001) available at 
http://www.poa-iss.org/PoA/poahtml.aspx [hereinafter Programme of Action] 
(marking states’ concurrence on measures needed to adequately combat illicit 
SALW trafficking); see also JOJARTH, supra note 1, at 255 (underscoring the lack 
of “compliance mechanisms for monitoring and enforce[ment]” in the Programme 
of Action). 
 28. See Bobby L. Scott, Note, The U.N. Conference on the Illicit Trade of 
Small Arms and Light Weapons: An Exercise in Futility, 31 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. 
L. 681, 691-95 (2003) (discounting the Programme of Action for its “prima facie 
unenforceability”). 
 29. DENISE GARCIA, SMALL ARMS AND SECURITY: NEW EMERGING 
INTERNATIONAL NORMS 53 (2006). 
 30. See ROGERS, supra note 1, at 102 (summarizing CIFTA’s development 
within the OAS in addressing narcotics trafficking occurring in South America). 
 31. See id. 
 32. See id.; see also SCHROEDER, supra note 7, at 4 (remarking that the CICAD 
Model Regulations complement CIFTA and attempt to standardize procedures 
used in OAS member states to manage the import, export, and transit of SALW). 
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the Permanent Council of the OAS.33 Member states were then 
permitted to comment on draft versions of CIFTA.34 CIFTA was 
finalized and opened for signature on November 14, 1997.35  
CIFTA seeks to avert illicit firearms manufacturing and trafficking 
through controls on the SALW trade and encourages mutual 
assistance between state parties.36 Under CIFTA, state parties are 
required, among other things, to: 1) criminalize illicit manufacturing 
and trafficking in SALW; 2) require the marking of firearms; 3) 
confiscate or forfeit illegal SALW and establish procedures to ensure 
their security; 4) establish and maintain licensing systems for the 
export, import, and transit of SALW; 5) maintain records of weapons 
transactions for a “reasonable” period of time; 6) cooperate and 
exchange information, experience and training, and technical 
assistance with other state parties; and 7) settle disputes through 
diplomatic channels.37  
CIFTA also called for the creation of a Consultative Committee to 
promote collaboration and information exchange, as well as 
recurring Conferences of State Parties to evaluate CIFTA’s 
implementation status.38 Although the Consultative Committee’s 
 
 33. See Permanent Council of the Organization of American States [OAS], 
Draft Convention Against the Illicit Manufacturing and Trafficking of Firearms, 
Ammunition, Explosives and Other Related Materials, iii, OEA/Ser.G 
CP/doc.2875/97 (Mar. 20, 1997) [hereinafter Draft Convention] (offering a draft 
version of CIFTA to the Permanent Council for consideration). The Rio Group was 
comprised of Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, 
Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela. ROGERS, supra note 1, at 102. 
 34. OAS, Working Group to Consider an Inter-American Convention Against 
the Illicit Manufacturing and Trafficking of Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives 
and Other Related Materials, Interim Report of the Firearms Subgroup, 
OEA/Ser.G/GT/CIFTA-2/97 (Mar. 31, 1997) [hereinafter Interim Report]. For the 
purposes of this Comment, each negotiation session for CIFTA or states’ public 
comments on the negotiations will be referred to as “CIFTA Working Group” 
followed by the appropriate OAS document number and date. 
 35. See CIFTA, supra note 10. 
 36. See CIFTA, supra note 10, art. II (CIFTA’s purpose is to “prevent, combat, 
and eradicate the illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in firearms” by 
“promot[ing] and facilitat[ing] cooperation and exchange of information and 
experience among States Parties”). 
 37. See id. arts. IV, VI, IX, XI, XIII-XVI, XXIX. 
 38. See id. arts. XX, XXI, XXVIII (necessitating a Consultative Committee to 
facilitate interactions between state parties, outlining the structure of committee 
meetings, and calling for a meeting of state parties within five years after entry into 
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decisions are not binding, they are influential.39 The Committee 
works closely with CICAD to create model regulations for each of 
CIFTA’s requirements.40  
In the years following its inception, CIFTA was lauded as a model 
legal framework for fighting SALW trafficking because it has a clear 
and narrow purpose and encourages small scale, cooperative law 
enforcement initiatives.41 CIFTA seeks only to curb the illicit trade in 
firearms and related goods and does not limit lawful trade or 
ownership of such items.42 Further, the required exchanges of 
information under CIFTA are cost effective, and the training 
programs are useful for states with weak governmental structures 
that may be unable to adequately prepare law enforcement officials 
to fight SALW trafficking.43  
States party to CIFTA have realized a number of the treaty’s 
goals.44 Notably, they have successfully convened two Conferences 
of States Parties, each of which has elicited a pronouncement 
recognizing CIFTA’s positive effect on OAS states and re-affirming 
 
force and at regular intervals thereafter). 
 39. See id. art. XX(2) (clarifying that Consultative Committee decisions “shall 
be recommendatory in nature”). 
 40. See, e.g., Conference of the States Party to the Inter-American Convention 
Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, 
Explosives, and Other Related Materials (CIFTA), Second Conference of the 
States Party to the CIFTA, Mexico City, Mex., Feb. 20-21, 2008, Tlatelolco 
Commitment, OEA/Ser.L/XXII.4 CIFTA/CEP-II/doc.7/08 rev.1 (Feb. 21, 2008) 
[hereinafter Tlatelolco Commitment] (agreeing to “strengthen the coordination and 
cooperation” between CIFTA’s Consultative Committee and CICAD, and noting 
that, as of 2008, model regulations existed for Articles IV, VI, X). 
 41. See Koh, supra note 2, at 2354-55 (assessing CIFTA as “the best model” of 
a legal framework with concrete goals); see also Zagaris, supra note 6, at 453 
(examining how agreements like CIFTA remove constraints on the ability of law 
enforcement officials to coordinate with their international counterparts). 
 42. See CIFTA, supra note 10, pmbl. (“[T]his Convention does not commit 
States Parties to enact legislation or regulations pertaining to firearms ownership, 
possession, or trade of a wholly domestic character . . . .”). 
 43. See Zagaris, supra note 6, at 453 (acknowledging that regional initiatives 
encouraged by agreements like CIFTA require fewer resources and allow 
developing states to glean expertise from states with superior law enforcement 
capabilities). 
 44. See Summary of Country Compliance, supra note 11 (identifying 
Argentina, Brazil, and Nicaragua as parties in substantial compliance with CIFTA 
and noting that the United States and Canada are also in substantial compliance 
although they have yet to ratify CIFTA). 
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states’ commitment to CIFTA’s implementation.45 The Second 
Conference of States Parties also resulted in a report compiling data 
on states’ compliance with CIFTA.46 Although the report showed 
that many states are failing to comply with CIFTA’s provisions, it 
singled out Argentina, Brazil, and Nicaragua as significantly 
complying with CIFTA.47  
With the help of CICAD, CIFTA’s Consultative Committee has 
successfully prepared model legislation to assist states in 
implementing CIFTA’s requirements as to weapons marking, export 
controls, confiscation and forfeiture, and domestic criminalization of 
illicit SALW manufacturing and trafficking.48 The Committee also 
established a schedule to consider model legislation on record 
keeping, information exchange, and security measures.49 Model 
legislation is critical for CIFTA’s implementation because it provides 
states with a legal text that can be easily incorporated into their 
domestic legislation.50 
Finally, states also utilize CIFTA’s framework to create or further 
the objectives of other international instruments.51 Shortly after 
 
 45. See Conference of the States Party to the Inter-American Convention 
Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, 
Explosives, and Other Related Materials (CIFTA), First Conference of the States 
Party, Bogota, Col., Mar. 8-9, 2004, Declaration of Bogota on the Functioning and 
Application of the Inter-American Convention Against the Illicit Manufacturing of 
and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, and Other Related Materials 
(CIFTA), ¶¶ 6, 24, OEA/Ser.L/XXII.4 CIFTA/CEP-I/DEC.1/04 rev.3 (Mar. 9, 
2004) [hereinafter Declaration of Bogota] (setting deadlines for states to establish 
a national point of contact and dates for future meetings, and encouraging states to 
implement CIFTA’s provision into domestic law); Tlatelolco Commitment, supra 
note 40, pmbl., ¶¶ 2-3 (recognizing progress made since the First Conference of 
States Party, but also reminding states of inadequate implementation levels). 
 46. See generally Summary of Country Compliance, supra note 11. 
 47. Id. at 1 (noting further that Canada and the United States have not ratified 
CIFTA but both meet its mandates). 
 48. See Tlatelolco Commitment, supra note 40, ¶ 4 (commending the creation 
of model legislation on marking, export controls, and establishment of criminal 
offenses); see also OAS, Comm. on Hemispheric Security, Draft Resolution, ¶¶ 3, 
5, OEA/Ser.G CP/CSH-1098/09 (May 6, 2009) (mentioning draft model legislation 
for confiscation and forfeiture). 
 49. See id. ¶ 3 (encouraging further model legislation for CIFTA’s provisions). 
 50. See JOJARTH, supra note 1, at 52 (explaining that model regulations 
“transform[] a convention’s substantive provisions into a legal text that is 
compatible with most states’ legal framework”). 
 51. See CIFTA, supra note 10, art. XXVII (allowing state parties to “engag[e] 
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CIFTA opened for signature, five state parties developed a registry 
and archive of firearms purchases through the Southern Common 
Market (“MERCOSUR”) regional trade agreement.52 More recently, 
representatives from CIFTA’s Consultative Committee have 
participated in U.N. workshops on SALW issues and the U.N. has 
praised CIFTA’s regional initiatives for their positive impact on state 
compliance with the Programme of Action.53 
2. Tackling SALW at the Global Level: The U.N. Protocol and 
Programme of Action 
There are two major SALW agreements that are global, rather than 
regional, in scope: the legally binding U.N. Protocol and the 
politically binding U.N. Programme of Action.54 Like CIFTA, both 
instruments seek to reduce crime, governmental instability, and 
human suffering by eliminating illicit SALW trafficking.55 Due to 
differences in their development and nature, however, each seeks to 
combat SALW through different means and practices.56 
 
in cooperation within the framework of other . . . international, bilateral, or 
multilateral agreements, or . . . arrangements or practices”). 
 52. See SCHROEDER, supra note 7, at 26 (elaborating on the firearms registry—
created by MERCOSUR parties Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay in 
1998—that contains a database of “valid buyers and sellers of firearms, and 
officially recognized points of entry and exit for firearms transfers”). 
 53. See Conference of the States Party to the Inter-American Convention 
Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, 
Explosives, and Other Related Materials (CIFTA), Consultative Committee Tenth 
Regular Meeting, Apr. 24, 2009, Report of the Secretariat Pro Tempore of the 
CIFTA Consultative Committee on Activities Carried Out During the Period 2008-
2009, 2-3, OEA/Ser.L/XXII.2.10 CIFTA/CC-X/doc.9/09 (Apr. 23, 2009) (outlining 
coordination between delegates of the United Nations and OAS during 2008-2009); 
see also GARCIA, supra note 29, at 59 (noting that the U.N. has recognized Latin 
American states for their leadership in implementing CIFTA and the Programme 
of Action). 
 54. See GARCIA, supra note 29, at 57-58 (chronicling the creation of the two 
global agreements). 
 55. See U.N. Protocol, supra note 26, pmbl. (highlighting the harmful effects of 
SALW trafficking on security and social and economic development); Programme 
of Action, supra note 27, pmbl. ¶¶ 2-3 (expressing concern that unlawful SALW 
trading increases poverty, underdevelopment, and violence). 
 56. See generally ROGERS, supra note 1, at 102-25 (contrasting binding and 
non-binding SALW agreements and explaining that the Programme of Action can 
be more demanding and inclusive than the U.N. Protocol because states are not 
obligated to comply). 
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The U.N. Protocol was developed within the framework of the 
United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime 
(“UNCATOC”) and has seventy-nine ratifying parties.57 Because it 
was closely connected to its parent treaty, the U.N. Protocol opened 
for signature in May 2001, but could not enter into force until after 
the UNCATOC did in September 2003.58 Additionally, though the 
U.N. Protocol was heavily influenced by CIFTA, adopting key 
provisions verbatim, its primary purpose is to reduce organized 
crime, not SALW trafficking.59 Application of the U.N. Protocol is 
specifically limited to situations “where . . . offenses are 
transnational in nature and involve an organized criminal group.”60  
In comparison, the Programme of Action is the largest and most 
comprehensive SALW instrument.61 The U.N. conducted over a 
decade’s worth of research to develop the Programme of Action and 
150 states adopted the instrument during a U.N. Conference in 
2001.62 As non-binding “soft law,” the Programme of Action 
contains ambitious provisions through which states promise to work 
at the national, regional, and international levels to curb illicit SALW 
trading.63 The Programme of Action has been criticized for its lack of 
enforcement mechanisms and the high financial cost of 
 
 57. See United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, 
art. 1, opened for signature Nov. 15, 2000, T.I.A.S. No. 13, 127, 2225 U.N.T.S. 
209 (articulating global commitment to “combat” organized criminal activity); see 
also Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General, vol. II, ch. XVIII, 
§ 12, http://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/MTDS G/Volume%20II/Chapter%20 
XVIII/XVIII-12.en.pdf (tracking ratification status of the United Nations 
Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime) (last visited Mar. 4, 2010). 
 58. ROGERS, supra note 1, at 103. 
 59. Id. at 104; see GARCIA, supra note 29, at 53 (commenting that CIFTA 
inspired negotiations for the U.N. Protocol). 
 60. U.N. Protocol, supra note 26, art. 4. 
 61. See U.N. General Assembly, Third Biennial Meeting of States to Consider 
the Implementation of the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate 
the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, New York, 
July 14-18, 2008, List of Participants, A/CONF.192/BMS/2008/INF/1/Add.1 
(Aug. 12, 2008) (listing the many states in attendance). 
 62. See Scott, supra note 28, at 683-90 (describing the history of the U.N. 
Programme of Action); ROGERS, supra note 1, at 117 (“Over 150 governments 
reached consensus on the [Programme of Action].”). 
 63. See ROGERS, supra note 1, at 117 (observing that the “broad-ranging” 
coverage of the Programme of Action includes everything from “conflict 
prevention” to “child soldiering”). 
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implementation.64 Still, it remains the leading international regulation 
on SALW.65  
B. EXAMPLES OF CIFTA VIOLATIONS: PAST AND (POSSIBLY) 
PRESENT 
1. Confirmed Violation: Diversion of Nicaraguan AK-47s 
In 2003, the OAS General Secretariat announced that Nicaragua 
had violated certain CIFTA provisions.66 The Nicaraguan National 
Police (“NNP”) had arranged a legitimate deal with Grupo de 
Representaciones Internacionales (“GIR S.A.”), a Guatemalan 
private arms dealership, to exchange AK-47s for pistols and mini-
Uzis.67 GIR S.A. secured a buyer, Shimon Yelinek, for the arms.68 
Unbeknownst to the NNP and GIR S.A., Yelinek was an illicit arms 
merchant posing as a Panamanian National Police official and 
presenting a forged purchase order.69 The NNP, GIR S.A., and 
Nicaraguan customs all failed to verify Yelinek’s purchase order.70 
The AK-47s were loaded onto a ship declared for Panama, but routed 
to Colombia and sold to the insurgent organization United Self 
Defense Forces of Colombia (“AUC”).71 According to OAS 
investigators, full implementation of CIFTA in Nicaragua and 
Panama “would have made the diversion far more difficult, if not 
prevented it outright.”72 
 
 64. See Scott, supra note 28, at 690-91 (identifying “fundamental flaws” such 
as the Programme of Action’s unenforceability). 
 65. See, e.g., JOJARTH, supra note 1, at 230 (“The [Programme of Action] is the 
central global agreement on preventing and reducing the trafficking and 
proliferation of SALW.”). 
 66. See Press Release, OAS, OAS Presents Report on Investigation of 
Diversion of Nicaraguan Arms to the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia, 
Reference E-011/03 (Jan. 20, 2003) available at http://www.oas.org/OASpage/ 
press_releases/press_release.asp?sCodigo=E-011/03 (concluding that CIFTA non-
compliance contributed to the diversion of AK-47s). 
 67. OAS, Report of the General Secretariat of the Organization of American 
States on the Diversion of Nicaraguan Arms to the United Defense Forces of 
Colombia, § 1(I), OEA/Ser.G CP/doc. 3687/03 (Jan. 6, 2003) [hereinafter 
Nicaraguan Diversion Report]. 
 68. Id. (noting that the Nicaraguan Army introduced the GIR S.A. to the NNP). 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. § 3(VI). 
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2. Probable Violation: Diversion of Venezuelan Anti-tank Rocket 
Launchers 
In late July 2009, the Colombian military seized from the terrorist 
group Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (“FARC”)Swedish-
made anti-tank rocket launchers legally sold to Venezuela in the late 
1980s.73 The weapons were confiscated during a raid of a FARC 
camp in October 2008.74 Also discovered in the raid were email 
messages by FARC commanders verifying plans to purchase surface 
to air missiles and sniper rifles from Venezuelan military officials.75 
FARC leaders denied obtaining the anti-tank machinery from 
Venezuela and Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez claimed the 
weapons were stolen from a naval base in 1995.76 Regardless of how 
and when FARC obtained these arms, this scenario suggests that 
Venezuela breached its obligations under CIFTA by failing to ensure 
the security of its SALW.77 
 
 73. Bazookas and Bases, ECONOMIST, Aug. 8, 2009, at 32. 
 74. See, e.g., Posting of Matt Schroeder to FAS Strategic Security Blog, 
http://www.fas.org/blog/s sp/2009/08/securing-venezuela’s-arsenals.php (Aug. 24, 
2009) (urging the international community to increase monitoring and fill gaps in 
Venezuela’s arms control). 
 75. Simon Romero, Evidence Shows Venezuelan Aid to Rebel Group, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 3, 2009, at A1. The U.S. Treasury Department has also accused the 
military officials implicated in these emails of arming, abetting, and funding 
FARC drug trafficking operations. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, 
Treasury Targets Venezuelan Government Officials Supporting the FARC (Sep. 
12, 2008) (targeting Henry de Jesus Rangel Silva, former director of Venezuela’s 
police intelligence agency, and Ramon Emilio Chacin, former Venezuelan Interior 
Minister for Investigation). 
 76. See Bazookas and Bases, supra note 73, at 32 (claiming that Chavez 
provided no proof to substantiate his claims that the weapons had been stolen); 
FARC Chief Denies Getting Launchers from Venezuela, ABC NEWS, Aug. 13, 
2009, http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory?id=8319433 (reporting that 
FARC commander Alfonso Cano repudiated allegations that he received weapons 
from Venezuela). 
 77. See Posting of Matt Schroeder to FAS Strategic Security Blog, supra note 
74 (asserting that the Venezuelan government is responsible for any weapons 
illegally diverted from its arsenals and reasoning that the international community 
should focus attention on increasing security on Venezuelan SALW and scrutinize 
the country’s SALW exports). 
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II. ANALYSIS 
International organizations like the OAS play a vital role in 
implementing controls on SALW because they facilitate cooperation 
between their member states and enable the negotiation of 
international agreements. Where international organizations are 
weak, however, is in their ability to guarantee state compliance with 
SALW regulations.78 By entering into a treaty, the member states of 
an international organization signal their willingness to uphold the 
standards promulgated by the treaty. States’ compliance with the 
terms of the treaty, however, is ultimately left to each individual state 
party.79 While states may face some negative consequences for non-
compliance, they are sovereign entities that have the ability to act in 
their own self interests.80 The failure of CIFTA’s parties to abide by 
its terms highlights OAS’ lack of police power and suggests that 
some negative repercussions are needed to induce state compliance.  
A. REVIEWING THE REASONS BEHIND CIFTA’S INEFFECTIVENESS 
More than ten years have passed since CIFTA was opened for 
signature and model regulations exist for five of its major provisions 
to help states integrate CIFTA’s requirements into their domestic 
law.81 Nonetheless, many of CIFTA’s ratifying states have failed to 
fully implement its provisions.82 A number of factors contribute to 
states’ continued non-compliance, including a dearth of financial 
resources within the OAS, state parties’ lack of capacity to 
 
 78. See, e.g., Nicaraguan Diversion Report, supra note 67, § 3(VII) (stating 
that the OAS has no police powers, and lamenting the inability of the OAS to 
prosecute the criminals responsible for the diversion of Nicaraguan arms). 
 79. See generally Williamson, supra note 23, at 60 (asserting that the 
conclusion of a treaty does not guarantee compliance and specifically evaluating 
factors that induce states’ compliance with arms control treaties). 
 80. See ROGERS, supra note 1, at 109-10 (stating that “governments do not 
surrender the power to act in ways contravening their [treaty] obligations” and 
observing that political and economic factors lead states to make calculated 
decisions regarding compliance). 
 81. See, e.g., Tlatelolco Commitment, supra note 40. 
 82. See Summary of Country Compliance, supra note 11, at 1 (reporting that 
the majority of CIFTA’s state parties are only partially complying with the treaty’s 
terms and that the national legislation of those states is “generally inadequate in 
one or more areas—most notably with regard to marking, export and in-transit 
licenses, and/or recordkeeping requirements”). 
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adequately train law enforcement officers, and a paucity of political 
will to propel implementation.83  
The pervasiveness of corruption within Latin America also hinders 
compliance.84 Corruption is deeply rooted within the region’s 
political structure, but CIFTA does not address the impact of 
corruption on SALW trafficking.85 There are also inadequacies in 
CIFTA’s textual provisions and shortcomings in the OAS’ execution 
of the treaty that contribute to non-compliance.86 While some of 
these factors are beyond CIFTA’s scope, textual inadequacies in 
CIFTA’s express terms and ineffective implementation methods can 
be cured within CIFTA’s framework through minor modifications 
and state cooperation.87 
1. CIFTA’s Failure to Provide Effective Mechanisms to Monitor and 
Enforce Compliance Hinders its Efficacy 
a. Effective Treaties Require Effective Mechanisms 
A major flaw in every international instrument regulating 
trafficking in SALW is the lack of formal mechanisms to monitor 
and enforce compliance.88 Compliance mechanisms generally 
 
 83. See SCHROEDER, supra note 7, at 27 (identifying a need for more training 
among CIFTA’s state parties); Williamson, supra note 23, at 72-74 (implying that 
parties are less likely to abide by the terms of a treaty when there is little to no 
political risk for non-compliance); Zagaris, supra note 6, at 470 (observing that the 
OAS is still recovering from near bankruptcy in the 1980s and that the law 
enforcement efforts are economically constrained). 
 84. See Luz Estella Nagle, The Challenges of Fighting Global Organized 
Crime in Latin America, 26 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1649, 1679-80 (2003) (advancing 
that corrupt public and private officials in Latin America encourage organized 
crime). 
 85. See id. at 1651, 59 (“Corruption, violence, and political, social, and 
economic instability have plagued Latin American nations for generations.”). 
 86. See infra Part II(A)(1), (2) (critiquing CIFTA for its lack of an effective 
compliance mechanism, for its inadequate definition of illicit trafficking, and for 
its provisions on confiscated SALW and licensing). 
 87. Cf. JOJARTH, supra note 1, at 226-30 (noting that specific SALW regimes, 
such as the Economic Community of West African States Convention, have been 
modified to contain monitoring schemes and recognizing the extremely specific 
terms of the Nairobi Protocol). 
 88. See ROGERS, supra note 1, at 110 (observing that CIFTA, the U.N. 
Protocol, the Programme of Action, and regional SALW agreements in Africa, 
Europe, and Asia each lack compliance mechanisms). 
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provide a program whereby an international or non-governmental 
organization oversees and verifies state implementation of a treaty.89 
Though often costly to establish and maintain, compliance 
mechanisms give treaties credibility because they create trust among 
states parties and make it difficult for states to evade their 
obligations.90 Similarly, compliance mechanisms may also provide a 
remedy if a state breaches a treaty’s provisions.91 
By submitting to the compliance mechanisms in a treaty, states 
relinquish some of their sovereignty because they are delegating 
power over their own responsibilities.92 To be effective, treaties must 
therefore provide incentives for states to conform to compliance 
mechanisms.93 Incentives may be negative, such as the imposition of 
sanctions or embargoes for non-compliance, or positive, like clauses 
calling for cooperation or mutual assistance.  
Negative incentives seem appealing because they are forceful, but 
they can have repressive results.94 For instance, imposing sanctions 
or a trade embargo on a country for failing to comply with the terms 
of a SALW trafficking treaty can lead to a drop in foreign direct 
investment in that country and, therefore, fewer available resources 
for individual citizens.95 There are also less harsh, yet effective 
 
 89. See generally MARAUHN, supra note 25, at 257-66 (evaluating various 
means of compliance control in arms agreements, including verification and 
inspection programs). 
 90. See JOJARTH, supra note 1, at 25 (conceding that the absence of compliance 
mechanisms undermines the credibility of states’ commitments to their treaty 
obligations); ROGERS, supra note 1, at 110 (explaining that compliance 
mechanisms provide transparency and help assure treaty parties that other parties 
are abiding by the treaty’s articles and provisions). 
 91. See MARAUHN, supra note 25, at 255-56, 66-70 (evaluating dispute 
resolution clauses in arms control agreements, which parties utilize when potential 
treaty breaches arise, as well as strategies used to end or rectify such violations). 
 92. See, e.g., JOJARTH, supra note 1, at 47-48 (stressing that sovereign states 
will incur the risk of delegating their powers to the party responsible for 
overseeing a compliance mechanism if it enhances the credibility of their treaty 
commitments). 
 93. See MARAUHN, supra note 25, at 250 (“Compliance with . . . arms control 
agreements largely depends on the incentives States parties perceive with regard to 
such agreements.”). 
 94. See id. at 251 (grappling with the often unjustly harsh effect of negative 
incentives). 
 95. See JOJARTH, supra note 1, at 40 (articulating that sanctions can deter 
investment as well as jeopardize a state’s ability to receive debt relief and aid). 
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negative incentives, such as prominent publication of non-complying 
states.96 In contrast, positive incentives induce state compliance by 
making the benefits of abiding by a treaty outweigh the costs of 
derogating from their obligations.97 Positive incentives should be 
more comprehensive than the benefits inherent in arms control 
agreements, such as enhanced national security.98 They must 
convince states that it is in their best interest to expend even scarce 
resources to comply with the treaty.99  
Regardless of which incentives a treaty utilizes, the treaty should 
ensure that states’ reputations are at risk if they do not meet their 
obligations, including obeying compliance mechanisms.100 States are 
most likely to comply when non-compliance will detrimentally 
impact their reputation.101 For example, a state will probably 
reconsider non-compliance with a treaty’s requirements if failure to 
conform will make other states less willing to deal with that state or 
if it will harm the state domestically by angering its electorate.102 
 
 96. Cf. id. at 39 (discussing the “naming and shaming” strategy used in the 
Kimberly Process where the names of states that fail to submit reports on their 
efforts to eliminate trade in conflict diamonds are published on the Process’s 
website). 
 97. See generally Williamson, supra note 23, at 71-74 (insisting that states 
utilize cost-benefit analyses to determine whether they will comply with their 
treaty obligations and listing scenarios which induce states into compliance). 
 98. See MARAUHN, supra note 25, at 251 (contending that because states enter 
into SALW agreements to improve their security, more than the mere guarantee of 
security is needed to induce them into compliance). 
 99. See JOJARTH, supra note 1, at 25-26 (reasoning that states are unlikely to 
abide by a treaty or a compliance mechanism if they do not receive clear-cut 
political and reputational benefits). 
 100. See id. at 25-30 (recognizing that a treaty’s credibility is enhanced when 
state parties are willing to incur reputational costs upon revocation or 
contravention of their commitments). 
 101. See Williamson, supra note 23, at 71 (rationalizing that the higher the 
“political risk of being labeled a lawbreaker,” the more likely states are to comply 
with their treaty obligations). 
 102. E.g., JOJARTH, supra note 1, at 26 (listing negative repercussions, both 
international and domestic, that result from states’ failure to comply with their 
formal obligations). 
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b. The Impact of CIFTA’s Lack of Compliance Mechanisms 
CIFTA does not provide compliance mechanisms.103 In fact, the 
closest CIFTA comes to providing compliance mechanisms is the 
requiring of a Consultative Committee and Conferences of States 
Parties.104 The Consultative Committee gathers information, 
facilitates exchanges between parties, and suggests ways in which 
states can improve their compliance.105 Decisions and proposals by 
the Consultative Committee are only recommendations and the 
Committee, therefore, cannot compel or enforce state compliance.106 
Additionally, compliance reports are presented at each Conference of 
States Parties.107 These compliance reports make public any 
deficiencies in states’ implementation of their treaty obligations. 
Unfortunately, the reports are unreliable because the information is 
self-reported and, thus, not transparent or verified by a body other 
than the reporting state.108  
Though CIFTA lacks formal compliance mechanisms, it has 
positive incentives embedded within its requirements.109 CIFTA 
mandates that parties confidentially exchange information, law 
enforcement experience, and training techniques.110 Ostensibly,  such 
exchanges allow CIFTA states to benefit from their fellow states 
parties’ knowledge and capabilities, but the extent of the benefits that 
state parties receive from these provisions is unclear. CIFTA’s 
 
 103. See ROGERS, supra note 1, at 110 (denouncing CIFTA’s failure to require 
government oversight of states’ compliance). But see Koh, supra note 2, at 2355 
(commending CIFTA’s framework for creating domestic obligations to be 
executed by state parties). 
 104. CIFTA, supra note 10, arts. XX, XXVIII. 
 105. Id. art. XX(1). 
 106. See id. art. XX(2). 
 107. See Declaration of Bogota, supra note 45, ¶ 23 (calling for the presentation 
of reports on compliance at each Conference of States Parties). 
 108. See Summary of Country Compliance, supra note 11, at 1 (acknowledging 
the potential deficiency of information used in the Summary of Country 
Compliance); JOJARTH, supra note 1, at 37-38 (criticizing self-reporting in 
compliance monitoring because states can couch their non-compliance in rhetoric 
and there is no “cross-check” to ensure validity). 
 109. See Koh, supra note 2, at 2355 (listing key provisions of CIFTA that drive 
states’ implementation of its requirements, such as requiring a system of 
import/export licensing of firearms). 
 110. See CIFTA, supra note 10, art. XII (guaranteeing the confidentiality of 
exchanged information). 
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requirements are vague, calling for exchanges only when they are 
“appropriate.”111 The provisions also fail to identify how to conduct 
and finance such exchanges, as well as what repercussions will result 
from non-cooperation.112 Inopportunely, the U.N. Protocol is just as 
ambiguous as CIFTA in this area.113 The U.N. Programme of Action, 
on the other hand, encourages states to establish regional level 
mechanisms for sharing information related to SALW trafficking.114  
Unlike other arms control agreements that utilize outside entities 
to help monitor compliance, CIFTA deals only with interactions 
among state parties.115 Though CIFTA acknowledges existing 
international law enforcement mechanisms, it does not require states 
to utilize them.116 In contrast, the U.N. Programme of Action 
encourages states and regional organizations to cooperate with non-
governmental organizations.117 The U.N. Protocol also requires states 
to cooperate with commercial entities involved in the SALW trade.118 
This is significant because it engages parties that have a strong 
financial stake in SALW and an interest in minimizing illicit 
trafficking to help further the agreements’ objectives.119  
 
 111. E.g., id. art. XV(2) (“States Parties shall cooperate . . . , as appropriate, to 
ensure . . . adequate training of personnel in their territories . . . .”); see also 
JOJARTH, supra note 1, at 257-59 (reproving the inclusion of clauses like “as 
appropriate,” “where applicable,” and “where needed” within treaties because they 
are indeterminate). 
 112. See JOJARTH, supra note 1, at 41 (noting that imprecision of treaty 
provisions makes it hard for states to distinguish acceptable from unacceptable 
behavior). 
 113. See generally U.N. Protocol, supra note 26 (providing minimal guidance 
on conducting exchanges of information and technology). 
 114. See Programme of Action, supra note 27, art. II(27) (calling upon states to 
establish “regional mechanisms,” including “networks for information-sharing 
among law enforcement”). 
 115. See generally CIFTA, supra note 10. 
 116. See, e.g., id. pmbl. (“Recognizing the importance of . . . mechanisms such 
as the International Weapons and Explosives Tracking System of [INTERPOL] . . . 
.”). 
 117. See Programme of Action, supra note 27, art. II(40) (encouraging 
international organizations and states to facilitate cooperation with non-
governmental organizations). 
 118. See U.N. Protocol, supra note 26, art. 13(3) (mandating that states seek the 
support of manufacturers, dealers, brokers and commercial carriers of SALW to 
combat illicit trafficking). 
 119. See JOJARTH, supra note 1, at 248-49 (linking the willingness of 
governments to work with the SALW industry to increased industry transparency 
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CIFTA additionally contains a weak dispute resolution provision 
for disagreements regarding its application or interpretation.120 While 
the U.N. Protocol specifies the steps states must take when they 
cannot agree, CIFTA merely calls for diplomatic settlement of 
disputes and does not give any direction as to what remedies are 
available.121The dispute resolution provisions in both treaties remain 
ineffective, however, because neither compels states to resort to a 
particular authority for settling disagreements.122  
CIFTA cannot attain its full potential without the addition of a 
mechanism that can monitor and verify compliance, and specific, 
official ramifications for non-compliance.123 Fortunately, this goal is 
within reach.  Certain states voiced concerns during the negotiation 
phase about CIFTA’s lack of compliance mechanisms, suggesting 
their willingness to support the addition of such a mechanism into 
the treaty.124 Further, as a “hard law” instrument, CIFTA is already 
 
and a higher likelihood of industrial players helping to fight unlawful SALW 
trading). 
 120. See CIFTA, supra note 10, art. XXIX (advising states to seek diplomatic 
settlement of any disagreement on CIFTA’s application or interpretation). 
 121. Compare U.N. Protocol, supra note 26, art. 16 (requiring states to seek 
dispute settlement in phases: 1) through negotiation, then 2) via arbitration, and 3) 
if the parties still cannot agree six months later, by referral to the International 
Court of Justice) with CIFTA, supra note 10, art. XXIX (“Any dispute . . . shall be 
resolved through diplomatic channels or . . . any other means of peaceful 
settlement.”). 
 122. See ROGERS, supra note 1, at 110 (implying that CIFTA and the U.N. 
Protocol would more effectively compel states’ compliance if they required states 
to seek recourse from judicial authorities and imposed penalties for non-
compliance). 
 123. See Zagaris, supra note 6, at 491 (concluding that everyday law 
enforcement practices within the OAS rely on support from binding treaties with 
“implementation and enforcement mechanisms that require accountability, 
transparency, and provide the means to impose sanctions on non-complying 
states”). 
 124. See, e.g., Permanent Council of the Organization of American States, 
CIFTA Working Group, Observations of the Member States on the Draft 
Convention Against the Illicit Manufacturing and Trafficking of Firearms, 
Ammunition, Explosives, and Other Related Materials: El Salvador, OEA/Ser.G 
GT/CIFTA-3/97 (May 8, 1997) (noting that El Salvador took issue with CIFTA’s 
lack of mechanisms to facilitate cooperation and implementation); Permanent 
Council of the OAS, CIFTA Working Group, Observations by Member States on 
the Draft Convention Against the Illicit Manufacturing and Trafficking of 
Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, Other Related Materials: Belize, art. II, 
OEA/Ser.G GT/CIFTA-3/97 (July 15, 1997) (expressing Belize’s discomfort with 
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better positioned to enjoy efficacy because its ratifying parties 
declared their willingness to legally bind themselves to its terms.125  
2. Minor Textual Inadequacies with Major Consequences 
The clarity of international instruments has a strong bearing on 
state compliance. Textual precision in treaties helps states overcome 
sovereignty barriers and narrows the scope of possible 
interpretations.126 Specificity in treaty terms also clarifies states’ 
obligations and allows other parties to readily identify when a state is 
not complying.127 Thus, the more precise the terms of a treaty, the 
more likely states are to comply with them because non-compliance 
risks damage to states’ political reputations.128 It is also essential that 
the terms of arms control treaties plainly outline states’ obligations 
because such treaties impact both state and human security.129  
The form and structure of SALW trafficking instruments dictate 
the specificity of their terms. “Hard law” instruments are sometimes 
purposefully vague to avoid costly negotiations and to induce 
compliance, while “soft law” instruments can be more precise 
without deterring states from signing on to them because they are not 
binding.130 Comparably, SALW agreements at the global level are 
necessarily broad because they represent agreements between dozens 
of states, whereas regional agreements like CIFTA can address arms 
 
CIFTA’s lack of control mechanisms and recommending the implementation of 
devices to ensure the regime’s efficacy). 
 125. See generally Williamson, supra note 23, at 71-74 (identifying contexts in 
which “hard law” instruments are likely to have a compliance advantage over “soft 
law” in SALW agreements). 
 126. See Zagaris, supra note 6, at 465 (conceding that multilateral agreements 
force states to give up some sovereignty, but stating that states cooperate more 
fluidly when “goals are distinct, technical, and clearly defined”). 
 127. See, e.g., JOJARTH, supra note 1, at 41-42 (implying that clear-cut treaty 
terms enhance an agreement’s credibility because states’ obligations are obvious 
and their derogation from those obligations is readily apparent). 
 128. See id. (emphasizing that the “reputational stakes of non-compliance” are 
increased when a state’s failure to comply can be easily discerned). 
 129. See Dekker, supra note 20, at 317-18 (stressing that clear language in arms 
control treaties allows states to predict and act upon their legal rights and duties 
under the treaty). 
 130. See generally JOJARTH, supra note 1, at 41-46 (addressing various theories 
on the precision of treaty terms). 
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trafficking in detail because each party understands the detrimental 
impact illicit SALW have on the region.131  
a. CIFTA’s Failure to Require Destruction of Confiscated Weapons 
and Proper Management of Surplus Stockpiles Leaves Many 
SALW Susceptible to Diversion 
Though early drafts of CIFTA provided for the destruction of 
confiscated and forfeited SALW,132 CIFTA is the only major SALW 
treaty that does not require the destruction of weapons seized.133 
CIFTA’s finalized provisions instead focus on ensuring that seized 
and surrendered weapons are not re-introduced into the market.134 
Similarly, CIFTA does not address surplus stockpile management.135 
The potential consequences of excluding these seemingly basic 
requirements from CIFTA’s text are grave.136 The military stockpiles 
of SALW in most CIFTA state parties are already too large and 
poorly secured.137 Military stockpiles in South American states, for 
 
 131. See GARCIA, supra note 29, at 58 (contending that small arms frameworks 
at the global level represent the “low[est] common denominator” due to regional 
differences); ROGERS, supra note 1, at 104-20 (scrutinizing the efficacy of both 
global and regional international SALW trafficking instruments); Zagaris, supra 
note 6, at 466 (stating that regional instruments are effective because the 
international organizations that promulgate them help states address region-
specific problems). 
 132. See, e.g., CIFTA Working Group, OEA/Ser.G GT/CIFTA-7/97 Art. III(11) 
(July 23, 1997) (obliging state parties to destroy or transfer to law enforcement for 
official use all illicitly produced or trafficked weapons). 
 133. See, e.g., U.N. Protocol, supra note 26, art. 6(2) (directing state parties to 
seize and destroy confiscated and forfeited SALW as a means to prevent further 
illicit trafficking); Programme of Action, supra note 27, art. II(16)-(19) 
(encouraging states to establish measures for SALW destruction and effective 
supervision of military inventories). 
 134. See CIFTA, supra note 10, art. VII (requiring state parties “to ensure that 
all [SALW] seized, confiscated, or forfeited . . . do not fall into the hands of 
private individuals or businesses through auction, sale, or other disposal”). 
 135. See ROGERS, supra note 1, at 108 (criticizing CIFTA for its inadequate 
consideration of SALW inventory safety as compared with the SADC Firearms 
Protocol and Nairobi Protocol, which oblige destruction of weapons surpluses). 
 136. See, e.g., CRAGIN & HOFFMAN, supra note 3, at 28-32 (declaring that most 
SALW trafficked into Colombia from Ecuador and Peru originate from stolen 
military stocks and that many are registered to the Venezuelan military). 
 137. See Aaron Karp, Surplus Arms in South America: A Survey 15 (Small Arms 
Survey, Working Paper No. 7, 2009) available at http://www.smallarmssurvey.org 
/files/sas/publications/w_papers_pdf/WP/WP7-Surplus-Arms-in-South-
America.pdf (evaluating South America’s substandard record of eliminating 
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example, collectively have 1.3 million more modern SALW than 
their militaries legitimately need.138 These stockpiles are notorious 
sources of illicitly trafficked weapons, either through theft or 
diversion by unscrupulous government employees.139 Adding 
confiscated weapons to states’ SALW inventories only increases the 
risk that they will be diverted, trafficked, and used for illegal 
purposes.140  
As its inclusion in both U.N. instruments demonstrates, the 
appropriate disposal of excess SALW is a globally accepted, and 
politically popular state practice.141 Destruction of excess SALW not 
only reduces the chances that the weapons will be resold, but also 
diminishes the likelihood that they will be stolen and used for 
nefarious or violent purposes.142 Regrettably, only seven of CIFTA’s 
states parties currently have programs in place to destroy seized and 
surrendered SALW.143  
States generally resist the idea of mandatory surplus destruction 
and view such a requirement as falling wholly within their domestic 
responsibilities.144 There is widespread recognition, though, that poor 
 
surplus SALW and noting the vulnerability of the region’s military stockpiles). 
 138. See id. (explaining that there are about 3.6 million modern SALW in South 
America even though the region’s militaries require only 2.3 million). 
 139. See JOJARTH, supra note 1, at 224 (discussing the risk of SALW losses 
through various sources). 
 140. See generally Karp, supra note 137, at 16 (examining the vulnerability of 
excessive supplies of SALW and the threat of unlawful and unintended SALW 
losses in South American states). 
 141. See generally GARCIA, supra note 29, at 65-90 (reviewing the provisions 
and policy implications of international instruments calling for destruction and 
disposal of surplus SALW). 
 142. See id. at 67-68 (remarking that weapons destruction programs prevent 
SALW from “falling into the hands of criminals” who contribute to increases in 
crime). 
 143. See id. at 59 (indicating that SALW destruction has become a norm in 
Argentina, Brazil, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Paraguay, and Peru). 
 144. See U.N. General Assembly, Third Biennial Meeting of States to Consider 
the Implementation of the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate 
the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, New York, 
July 14-18, 2008, Report of the Third Biennial Meeting of States to Consider the 
Implementation of the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the 
Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, § IV(III)(17), 
A/CONF.192/BMS/2008/3 (Aug. 20, 2008), [hereinafter Third Biennial Meeting 
Report] (“States stressed that decision-making on stockpile management . . . was a 
national prerogative.”). 
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stockpile management is a major security threat and that surpluses 
only exacerbate that threat.145 Stockpiles in many CIFTA states 
parties are susceptible to diversions through mismanagement, sale by 
corrupt government officials, or via raids by criminals or rebel 
groups.146 This susceptibility becomes even more apparent when 
viewed in the context of Venezuela’s potential breach of CIFTA. 
Here, proper stockpile management would have prevented the loss of 
the anti-tank weapons and Colombia could (and should) destroy 
them to guarantee they are never used for harm.147  
The global consensus on the importance of destroying confiscated 
and forfeited weapons, combined with the weak stockpile 
management provisions in CIFTA, demonstrates the need to amend 
CIFTA to require destruction of surplus SALW and effective arsenal 
management. Similarly, the prior desire of CIFTA’s states parties to 
include destruction requirements in the treaty and the 
commencement of some destruction programs within the region 
shows that such requirements would likely be accepted. Thus, 
including destruction and stockpile management requirements into 
CIFTA’s Articles VII and VIII, respectively, could exert pressure on 
state parties sufficient to induce them into compliance since failure to 
fulfill such obligations would be politically detrimental.148 
 
 145. See id. § IV(III)(17)-(22) (recounting state parties’ views on inadequately 
monitored stockpiles and continued accumulation of weapons as security threats). 
 146. See, e.g., CRAGIN & HOFFMAN, supra note 3, at 29-30 (noting that 
Colombian rebel groups are known to raid other states’ weapons reserves); 
SCHROEDER, supra note 7, at 22 (elaborating on trafficking methods that weapons 
smugglers in Ecuador and Venezuela use). 
 147. See, e.g., Posting of Matt Schroeder to FAS Strategic Security Blog, supra 
note 74 (deriding the Venezuelan government for failing to safeguard its military 
arsenals and calling on states to closely monitor their SALW). 
 148. See Dekker, supra note 20, at 325 (averring that the possibility of damage 
to states’ political reputation can cause them to alter their behavior); GARCIA, 
supra note 29, at 68 (“Key practitioners in the small-arms debate have pointed to 
stockpile management and destruction of excess arms as the simplest and most 
reliable way to prevent proliferation of illicit arms.”). But see Scott, supra note 28, 
at 698-701 (attacking the virtue of arms trafficking regimes and arguing that 
reducing the supply of SALW merely makes illicit trafficking more lucrative for 
smugglers). 
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b. CIFTA Fails to Clearly Identify What Information Licenses for 
SALW Transfers Must Contain and to Mandate End-User 
Requirements  
Licenses for and other regulations on SALW transfers, including 
imports, exports, and in-transit shipments, are necessary to control 
the legal weapons trade and to combat unlawful SALW trafficking.149 
Because licenses and authorizations are essential to SALW trade, it 
is imperative that their regulating instruments clearly identify what 
information licenses should contain and which kind of licenses states 
ought to demand.150  
Precision and transparency in the SALW licensing process is 
especially important for CIFTA’s member states.151 Fraudulent 
transfer licenses and certifications largely contribute to illegal SALW 
diversions within the region.152 Moreover, CIFTA members are 
predominantly importing states and tend to utilize import controls 
more than export controls because SALW pose a higher risk of harm 
to importing states.153 Export controls with end-use requirements, 
 
 149. See generally OWEN GREENE & ELIZABETH KIRHAM, SMALL ARMS AND 
LIGHT WEAPONS TRANSFER CONTROLS TO PREVENT DIVERSION: DEVELOPING AND 
IMPLEMENTING KEY PROGRAMME OF ACTION COMMITMENTS (2007) (outlining the 
purpose and mechanics of trade regulations on SALW and specifically analyzing 
regulations under the Programme of Action). See also YANN AUBIN & ARNAUD 
IDIART, EXPORT CONTROL LAW AND REGULATIONS HANDBOOK: A PRACTICAL 
GUIDE TO MILITARY AND DUAL-USE GOODS TRADE RESTRICTIONS AND 
COMPLIANCE (2007) (discussing laws regulating the lawful weapons trade). 
 150. See, e.g., Posting of Matt Schroeder to FAS Strategic Security Blog, supra 
note 74 (expounding upon the relationship between rigorous trade authorizations 
and the fight against illicit trafficking with particular emphasis on Venezuela). 
 151. See, e.g., Clinton Urges Transparency in Venezuelan Arms Purchases, 
VOANEWS, Sept. 15, 2009, http://www.voanews.com/english/news/a-13-2009-09-
15-voa60-68709812.html (voicing concern about the connection between the lack 
of transparency in Venezuela’s arms acquisitions and diversions of SALW to 
illegal groups). 
 152. See, e.g., Nicaraguan Diversion Report, supra note 67, §§ 1(I), 3(IV) 
(calling attention to the use of fraudulent trade documentation by SALW 
traffickers and advising CIFTA’s state parties to abide by its licensing provisions 
and consider applying the CICAD Firearms Regulations). 
 153. See JOJARTH, supra note 1, at 242-43 (deducing that states relying 
predominantly on imported SALW benefit from controls on SALW transfers); 
ROGERS, supra note 1, at 151 (reporting states’ general preference for small arms 
import controls over export controls). This is particularly true when importing 
states are also suffering from on-going internal conflict. See JOJARTH, supra note 
1, at 243 (referring to Colombia’s ardent support of tight SALW controls as a 
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however, generally force the exporting state to identify the purchaser 
of each SALW and prohibit the purchaser from transferring weapons 
to any other party.154 Therefore, insisting upon export controls with 
end-use requirements would certify that SALW go only to the 
legitimate buyer to which they are exported.155  
Article IX of CIFTA mandates only that states establish licensing 
procedures and that they confirm that any states involved in a 
transfer of SALW have issued authorizing documentation before 
allowing the transfer to proceed.156 Though the CICAD Firearms 
Regulations provide CIFTA states with some guidance, as they 
outline in detail what the OAS’s member states ought to demand in 
terms of transfer licensing, CIFTA itself provides states with no 
direction.157 Comparing CIFTA to the U.N.’s SALW instruments 
also makes clear that CIFTA’s licensing provisions are much less 
rigorous than they should be. In addition to the state party 
authorizations demanded by CIFTA, the U.N. Protocol outlines the 
minimum information required in export and import licenses and any 
related documentation.158 The Programme of Action goes even 
further, encouraging states to implement laws requiring the 
utilization of end-use certificates.159  
Providing minimum information requirements and mandating 
verification of licenses would reduce the risk of CIFTA violations.160 
 
means to frustrate rebel groups’ access to SALW). 
 154. See GREENE & KIRKHAM, supra note 149, at 14-17 (noting cases of 
inadequate end-user controls and the acceptance of illicit end-use certification). 
 155. See, e.g., Posting of Matt Schroeder to FAS Strategic Security Blog, supra 
note 74 (stressing the need for end-user requirements in weapons sales throughout 
South America). 
 156. CIFTA, supra note 10, art. IX. 
 157. See SCHROEDER, supra note 7, at 4 (observing that the CICAD Firearms 
Regulations “seek to harmonize procedures and documentation used by OAS 
member states to control” the SALW trade). 
 158. See U.N. Protocol, supra note 26, art. 10(3) (requiring export and import 
licenses, authorizations, and accompanying documentation to contain the place and 
date of issuance, date of expiration, exporting and importing country, final 
recipient, a description of the SALW, and the names of countries through which 
the SALW will be shipped). 
 159. See Programme of Action, supra note 27, art. II(12) (undertaking “[t]o put 
in place and implement adequate . . . procedures to ensure effective control over 
the export and transit of [SALW], including the use of authenticated end-user 
certificates”). 
 160. Cf. ROGERS, supra note 1, at 150-51 (observing domestic regulatory 
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Had such provisions been in place prior to the diversion of 
Nicaraguan arms, customs officials would have been better 
positioned to review Yelinek’s fraudulent certifications and thwart 
the diversion.161 In fact, Colombia criticized CIFTA’s meager 
licensing provisions during the negotiation phase, arguing that 
CIFTA should state exactly what information import and export 
licenses should contain.162 In addition, states and scholars alike stress 
the need for importing and exporting states to demand end-user 
requirements on SALW shipments.163 End-user requirements are 
particularly vital for CIFTA’s states parties at present, given their 
continued acquisition of large numbers of SALW from major 
exporting states like Russia and France.164  
Some scholars have argued that states are less inclined to comply 
with tight controls on the SALW trade.165 But these contentions fail 
to consider the economic aspects of SALW exports. States with a 
stake in the SALW market do not want to chill trade and are 
therefore more likely comply with increased licensing 
requirements.166 Consequently, the addition of specific licensing and 
 
regimes that many states have implemented that align with their international 
treaty obligations to control SALW). 
 161. See Nicaraguan Diversion Report, supra note 67, at 14 (arguing that 
Nicaragua failed to abide by CIFTA Article IX and asserting that Nicaraguan law 
should clearly establish what customs officials must look for on SALW licenses). 
 162. See, e.g., OAS, CIFTA Working Group, Observations by Member States on 
the Draft Convention Against the Illicit Manufacturing and Trafficking of 
Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, Other Related Materials: Colombia, 7, 
OEA/Ser.G GT/CIFTA-3/97 add. 6-a (July 11, 1997) [hereinafter Observations by 
Member States: Colombia] (setting forth Colombia’s proposed wording for CIFTA 
art. V, requiring, at a minimum, proof of a national certificate; country, date, and 
identification of the end-user; authorizing agency/importing state; and total 
quantity of weapons shipped). 
 163. See, e.g., Third Biennial Meeting Report, supra note 144, § IV(II)(12) 
(“States noted the importance of end-user certification, including verification 
measures, in addressing the problem of illicit brokering.”); Posting of Matt 
Schroeder to FAS Strategic Security Blog, supra note 74 (insisting that states 
exporting SALW to Venezuela implement end-use requirements). 
 164. See, e.g., Robert Munks, Could War Erupt in Arms-Spree LatAm?, BBC 
NEWS, Sept. 15, 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/8256686.stm (drawing 
attention to recent large-scale military purchases in South America). 
 165. See JOJARTH, supra note 1, at 237-38 (suggesting states shirk licensing 
responsibilities when it is in their own political interest to do so). 
 166. See generally id. at 234-48 (reviewing the costs and benefits to states from 
compliance with SALW instruments, including licensing provisions). 
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end-user requirements to CIFTA’s text would be a feasible and 
realistic step towards enhancing the security of CIFTA’s states 
parties.  
c. CIFTA’s Failure to Include Unmarked or Inadequately Marked 
SALW in its Definition of “Illicit Trafficking” Prevents Effective 
Detection and Prevention of Unlawful SALW Trafficking 
CIFTA defines “illicit trafficking” as any trade or transfer of 
SALW not authorized by the importing, exporting, and in-transit 
states.167 This definition is broad and encompasses both legal and 
black or gray market transfers of weapons.168 It does not, however, 
make any reference to states’ obligations under Article VI of CIFTA 
to mark weapons so that they can be easily identified.169 In 
comparison, Article 3 of the U.N. Protocol has nearly the same 
definition of “illicit trafficking,” but considers unmarked or 
inadequately marked weapons to be illicit.170 The parties to the U.N. 
Protocol recognized that incorporating marking provisions into the 
definition of “illicit trafficking” helped to regulate transfers of 
unmarked firearms.171 Providing a similar recognition within 
 
 167. See CIFTA, supra note 10, art. I(2) (“‘Illicit trafficking’: the import, export, 
acquisition, sale, delivery, movement, or transfer of firearms, ammunition, 
explosives, and other related materials from or across the territory of one State 
Party to that of another State Party, if any one of the States Parties concerned does 
not authorize it.”). 
 168. See CRAGIN & HOFFMAN, supra note 3, at 58-60 (indicating that illicitly 
trafficked weapons can originate from both the licit and illicit markets). 
 169. See CIFTA, supra note 10, art. VI (requiring firearms marking at the time 
of manufacture and import, and on confiscated or forfeited weapons retained for 
official use). 
 170. U.N. Protocol, supra note 26, art. 3(e) (including “firearms . . . not marked 
in accordance with article 8 of this Protocol” within the definition of illicit 
trafficking). The Programme of Action does not specifically define illicit 
trafficking. See generally Programme of Action, supra note 27 (lacking a section 
defining key terms of the agreement). See also U.N. OFFICE OF DRUGS & CRIME, 
TRAVAUX PRÉPARATOIRES OF THE NEGOTIATIONS FOR THE ELABORATIONS OF THE 
UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION AGAINST TRANSNATIONAL CRIME 605 (United 
Nations 2006) [hereinafter TRAVAUX PRÉPARATOIRES] (showing that firearms 
marking was not included in the U.N. Protocol’s definition of illicit trafficking as 
of the first negotiating session in January of 1999). 
 171. See U.N. Protocol, supra note 26, art. 3(e) (acknowledging that state 
representatives at the U.N. Protocol negotiations willingly included marking as 
part of the definition of “illicit trafficking”). 
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CIFTA’s text is necessary to induce the treaty’s parties into 
compliance with their marking obligations under Article VI.172  
Firearms marking is generally accepted as a necessary component 
of pursuing illicit weapons traffickers, controlling unwanted 
diversions of weapons, and conducting effective investigations and 
prosecutions.173 For instance, serial numbers on the anti-tank 
weapons seized from FARC in Colombia were used to trace the 
weapons back to a Swedish company.174 State non-compliance with 
marking requirements, which alone is a breach of CIFTA’s 
provisions, severely hinders the law enforcement process.175 In 
addition, the significance of marking is even more apparent given the 
problem of unsecured surplus SALW stockpiles throughout Latin 
America.176 
As of February 2008, only seven of the thirty parties to CIFTA 
had domestic legislation requiring firearms marking.177 Including the 
failure to adequately mark weapons within CIFTA’s definition of 
“illicit trafficking” would provide an impetus for states to enforce its 
marking provisions. Further, broadening Article I’s definition of 
“illicit trafficking” would allow states to criminalize trading of 
unmarked or inadequately marked weapons under Article IV.178 
 
 172. See Summary of Country Compliance, supra note 11, at 1 (censuring states 
for the overall levels of non-compliance with CIFTA’s marking requirements). 
 173. See GARCIA, supra note 29, at 57 (describing the marking system required 
by the U.N. Protocol and the essential role of marking in law enforcement efforts 
to recover diverted SALW). 
 174. E.g., Posting of Matt Schroeder to FAS Strategic Security Blog, supra note 
74 (describing the discovery of arms within a FARC camp). 
 175. See CIFTA, supra note 10, art. VI (obliging state parties to require 
markings at the time of manufacture and import, and upon confiscated or forfeited 
weapons); GARCIA, supra note 29, at 57 (stressing “[t]he importance of firearm-
marking to the law enforcement community”). 
 176. See Karp, supra note 137, at 4 (noting that unguarded surplus military 
small arms increase the risk that diverted weapons will be used in civil violence 
and underscoring the need for effective checks on unlawful diversions). 
 177. See generally Summary of Country Compliance, supra note 11 (outlining 
each OAS member’s compliance with each of CIFTA’s technical requirements). 
 178. See CIFTA, supra note 10, art. IV (requiring states to criminalize illicit 
trafficking). 
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III. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Trafficking of illegally diverted weapons threatens both human 
and state security throughout Latin America.179 Despite the dire 
consequences this situation presents, CIFTA’s reputable and crucial 
goals “to prevent, combat, and eradicate” illicit weapons trafficking 
have yet to be attained.180 CIFTA’s states parties are non-compliant, 
its framework remains inadequate, and efforts to execute the treaty 
have been weak and insubstantial.181 CIFTA’s Consultative 
Committee and the OAS should respond to this situation by 
designing mechanisms to guarantee implementation of CIFTA’s 
provisions in each of the ratifying state parties and by advocating 
textual amendments to CIFTA. 
A. MECHANISMS FOR MONITORING AND ENFORCING COMPLIANCE 
SHOULD BE CREATED TO FACILITATE STATES’ IMPLEMENTATION 
OF CIFTA 
CIFTA’s goals will not be attained without incentivizing 
compliance and facilitating dispute resolution. At present, there is no 
official oversight of states parties’ implementation of CIFTA.182 The 
ideal compliance mechanism for CIFTAwould be objective, 
institutionalized supervision of compliance by a well-recognized 
non-governmental organization.183 Unfortunately, such a solution is 
unlikely within the OAS because it is expensive and the OAS utilizes 
non-governmental organizations only for their expert opinions and 
advice regarding the functioning of its own organs.184 Still, the OAS 
 
 179. See, e.g., CRAGIN & HOFFMAN, supra note 3, at 53-54 (commenting that 
illicit trafficking has “contributed to an escalation of violence in Colombia” and 
surrounding states). 
 180. CIFTA, supra note 10, art. II. See generally Koh, supra note 2 (expounding 
upon the integral role of SALW regimes in stemming the violence that illegal 
weapons cause). 
 181. See generally Summary of Country Compliance, supra note 11 (reporting 
the implementation deficiencies in each of CIFTA’s state parties). 
 182. See ROGERS, supra note 1, at 110 (stressing CIFTA’s lack of a formal 
mechanism to guarantee states’ compliance). 
 183. See JOJARTH, supra note 1, at 245 (claiming active monitoring by non-
governmental organizations reduces the risk of states avoiding their obligations). 
See generally Marauhn, supra note 25, at 262-66 (describing various means of 
compliance verification, including institutionalization of compliance procedures). 
 184. See OAS, Permanent Council, Guidelines for the Participation of Civil 
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should strive to avoid directly addressing state responsibility, as this 
is a disfavored approach in multilateral agreements like CIFTA.185 
A more viable option is building a verification and monitoring 
regime into the treaty. The responsibilities of the Consultative 
Committee should be expanded beyond simple information gathering 
and its suggestions should be more than merely “recommendary.”186 
At a minimum, the Committee should be able to require states to 
exchange information when necessary and monitor such exchanges 
rather than waiting for states to cooperate between themselves.187 
Going further, procedures for routine verification inspections should 
be established.188 States may resist such inspections, viewing them as 
sovereignty infringements, so the inspections should be conducted by 
an OAS consultant, rather than a state-representative on the 
Consultative Committee. Regardless of the specific inspection 
process chosen by the OAS, states should be made aware of the 
nature, duration, and schedule of inspections.189  
In conjunction with this recommendation, the OAS should also 
solicit, if not require, the assistance of businesses and non-
governmental organizations. The addition of a provision like Article 
13 of the U.N. Protocol, which requires states to cooperate with 
 
Society Organizations in OAS Activities, ¶ 3, OEA/Ser.G CP/RES. 759 (1217/99) 
(Dec. 15, 1999) (defining the scope of participation of civil society groups, 
including non-governmental organizations, as providing expert advice and 
participating in the design, finance, and execution of OAS projects). See generally 
ROGERS, supra note 1, at 191-97 (identifying financial cost as a drawback to 
institutionalized compliance monitoring). 
 185. See Marauhn, supra note 25, at 270 (noting that terms such as “legality” 
and “illegality” are rarely used in compliance provisions because they come too 
close to addressing state responsibility, which is generally avoided in treaties). 
 186. See Marauhn, supra note 25, at 256 (providing an example of a standing 
consultative committee with the ability to field parties’ questions about other 
states’ compliance and provide advice on how to handle ambiguous situations). 
 187. See, e.g., JOJARTH, supra note 1, at 38 (discussing compliance regimes in 
which international institutions authenticate state-to-state transactions by cross-
checking parties’ submitted reports against one another). 
 188. See Marauhn, supra note 25, at 258 (identifying transparent verification as 
an essential means to build trust between states and pressure them into 
compliance). 
 189. See Dekker, supra note 20, at 320 (specifying important components of 
verification processes and explaining that verification is not continual or 
permanent but rather it is a responsive mechanism). 
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industrial players, is worthy of consideration.190 Such a provision 
could assist with the financial burden of implementing a compliance 
regime because entities with a financial stake in the SALW trade 
may be a valuable source of funding. Moreover, a non-governmental 
organization can be engaged to publicly identify non-compliant 
states on a website or in a publication in an effort to pressure those 
states into compliance.191 
Dispute resolution procedures should also be considered when 
formulating a compliance mechanism. Presently, CIFTA provides 
only that state parties are to resolve disputes diplomatically.192 State 
initiated investigations by the General Secretariat exist as a means 
for states to obtain an objective assessment of problematic 
situations.193 Making such investigations mandatory upon suspicion 
of treaty violations or providing another specific procedure for states 
to follow could encourage them to seek official remedies for 
potential breaches of CIFTA.  
B. CIFTA SHOULD BE AMENDED TO PROVIDE FOR DESTRUCTION 
OF CONFISCATED AND FORFEITED WEAPONS, PROPER STOCKPILE 
MANAGEMENT, DETAILED LICENSING, AND MANDATORY END-
USE REQUIREMENTS FOR ALL SALW, AND AN EXPANDED 
DEFINITION OF ILLICIT TRAFFICKING  
CIFTA’s framework is based upon the general international 
consensus against SALW trafficking and it loosely outlines states’ 
domestic obligations.194 As a regional agreement, however, CIFTA 
should be at least as specific as a global agreement to be effective. 
 
 190. See U.N. Protocol, supra note 26, art. 13(3) (“State Parties shall seek the 
support and cooperation of manufacturers, [traders], and commercial carriers of 
[SALW] . . . .”). 
 191. See, e.g., JOJARTH, supra note 1, at 39 (recognizing publication of 
compliance status as a way to involve civil society in the compliance monitoring 
process). But see Dekker, supra note 20, at 325 (warning that states may become 
less cooperative with a compliance regime when under pressure). 
 192. See CIFTA, supra note 10, art. XXIX (calling for resolution of disputes 
through “diplomatic channels”). 
 193. See, e.g., Nicaraguan Diversion Report, supra note 67, § 2(I) (noting that 
Colombia, Nicaragua, and Panama requested an investigation by the OAS General 
Secretariat into a large scale illicit diversion of AK-47s). 
 194. See Koh, supra note 2, at 2354-55 (extolling CIFTA’s legal framework and 
the domestic legislative actions it requires). 
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Thus, CIFTA and its states parties would benefit from the inclusion 
of certain textual amendments, particularly if instituted together with 
an effective compliance mechanism which would verify that new 
requirements are being met.  
1. Required Destruction of Confiscated and Forfeited Weapons and 
Effective Stockpile Management Will Reduce the Risk of Illicit SALW 
Trafficking in CIFTA States 
CIFTA’s Article VII should be altered to require states parties to 
destroy confiscated or forfeited weapons. States parties are likely to 
be amenable to such a requirement; parties to the U.N. Protocol were 
willing to obligate themselves to the practice of destruction and 
seven CIFTA states already do so.195 Further, this amendment should 
also require states to devise a destruction procedure that is 
transparent, considers the military’s actual SALW needs, and 
contains sufficient oversight to control potential losses through 
corrupt employees.196  
Next, CIFTA’s Article VIII should call for appropriate stockpile 
management. The Article’s vague references to security measures are 
insufficient to combat the threat of diversion from unsecured 
stockpiles.197 The text should be modified to require well-managed 
and well-administered oversight of SALW reserves.198 Because 
requiring destruction of surplus weapons is stringent and states may 
resist such an imposition, CIFTA states should alternatively consider 
adjusting the text to suggest that surplus destruction is preferable, but 
not required.199 Finally, CIFTA should develop procedures that can 
 
 195. See supra Part II(A)(2)(a) (acknowledging that destruction is required 
under Article 6(2) of the U.N. Protocol and that Argentina, Brazil, Costa Rica, 
Guatemala, Nicaragua, Paraguay, and Peru already practice destruction). 
 196. See Karp, supra note 137, at 4 (calling for public scrutiny of SALW 
destructions and assurances that states are not inflating their projected needs for 
military weapons). 
 197. See supra Part II(A)(2)(a) (criticizing CIFTA’s failure to specify security 
measures for protecting SALW stocks). 
 198. See generally Karp, supra note 137 (assessing problems associated with 
inadequately secured military stockpiles and providing detailed recommendations). 
 199. See Third Biennial Meeting Report, supra note 144, at 12 (showing state 
parties to the Programme of Action preferred national handling of surplus 
destruction). 
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negate the chances of diversion of SALW from stockpiles by 
disreputable government workers.  
2. The Addition of Licensing and End-User Requirements into 
CIFTA’s Text Will Assist Law Enforcement in Combating Trafficking 
and Clarify States’ Responsibilities 
Article IX of CIFTA should be modified to identify the minimum 
amount of information that must appear on SALW licenses. CIFTA’s 
states parties signaled a desire for guidance on licensing procedures 
during negotiations and would therefore likely be open to the 
modification.200 Probable solutions include either making Article IX 
mirror the U.N. Protocol’s Article 10(3) or incorporating the CICAD 
Model Regulations into CIFTA’s text.201 
Additionally, Article IX should require exporting states to include 
end-user requirements on their exports, and more importantly, to 
require importing states to demand end-user requirements from any 
states exporting arms into their territory.202 End-user requirements 
are widely acknowledged as an effective means of fighting unlawful 
diversions because they force exporters and exporting states to 
shoulder some of the burden.203 The OAS may also consider 
requiring rigorous end-use monitoring, which would entail follow-up 
inspections on arms exports into states’ territories.204  
 
 200. See Observations by Member States: Colombia, supra note 162, at 7-8 
(emphasizing the usefulness of detailed licensing provisions). 
 201. See supra Part II(A)(2)(b) (analyzing weaknesses in CIFTA’s licensing 
provisions by comparison to the U.N. Protocol and considering perspectives voiced 
at CIFTA’s negotiation). 
 202. See Posting of Matt Schroeder to FAS Strategic Security Blog, supra note 
74 (advocating for stringent end-user requirements to combat SALW in OAS 
member states). 
 203. See generally GREENE & KIRKHAM, supra note 149 (explaining the 
breakdown of parties’ responsibilities within transfer controls on SALW). 
 204. See, e.g., Posting of Matt Schroeder to FAS Strategic Security Blog, supra 
note 74 (articulating a need for end-user requirements across South America and 
suggesting methods of implementation). 
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3. Including Marking Requirements in CIFTA’s Definition of “Illicit 
Trafficking” Will Expand CIFTA’s Reach and Promote Law 
Enforcement Efforts to Track Illegal SALW 
CIFTA’s Article I(2) should be amended to include transfers of 
unmarked or inadequately marked weapons within the definition of 
“illicit trafficking” because it will broaden CIFTA’s scope and 
promote effective law enforcement by ensuring the tracing of 
illegally diverted weapons.205 This addition would also encourage 
states to adopt the Consultative Committee’s model legislation on 
marking since they would be held responsible for the failure to mark.  
Along with the amendment to Article I(2), Article IV should be 
modified to require the criminalization of falsifying or obliterating 
markings on weapons. While it cannot be added until marking is 
included in “illicit trafficking,” this modification is necessary given 
Latin American states’ growing arsenals and may further dissuade 
gray market transfers by corrupt government officials.206  
CONCLUSION 
Illicit SALW trafficking is rampant in Latin America; there are 98 
known trafficking routes into Colombia alone.207 Across the region, 
weapons ranging from AK-47s to anti-tank missiles are extremely 
easy to acquire and even easier to use. The business of arms 
trafficking is lucrative for the criminals involved, but it represents a 
grave threat to Latin American society because illegal SALW trading 
brings with it increased levels of violence and strained inter-state 
relations.  
In passing CIFTA, OAS member states, comprised primarily of 
Latin American nations, were at the forefront of the movement to 
combat SALW trafficking. CIFTA even served as a model for the 
 
 205. See GARCIA, supra note 29, at 57 (describing marking as an integral tool in 
the investigation of illegally trafficked weapons). 
 206. See Scott, supra note 28, at 699 (observing that corruption and profit-
making motives of government officials are often responsible for illegal transfers 
of weapons because lax controls allow them to evade detection). 
 207. See CRAGIN & HOFFMAN, supra note 3, at 18 (listing SALW trafficking 
routes into Colombia, including “21 . . . from Venezuela, 26 from Ecuador, 37 
from Panama, and 14 from Brazil”). 
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U.N. Protocol. Unfortunately, state non-compliance and ineffective 
approaches to implementation have limited CIFTA’s ability to 
combat the SALW threat. These errors are not irreversible. CIFTA’s 
efficacy can be enhanced and its purpose realized through minor 
textual amendments to the treaty and the creation of a compliance 
scheme that accounts for corruption. 
 
